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Abstract  
It is challenging to distinguish the role of information in tax compliance from 
other factors affecting it. This paper utilizes a novel natural field experiment 
design to study the issue. In the experiment firms reporting their VAT were sent 
a letter asking them questions about their attitude towards the tax authority. The 
introductions to the questions provided candid information about VAT rules for a 
randomized treatment group, while a randomized control group was only asked 
questions without additional information. We observe the effects of the 
treatments directly from firm-level tax records. Providing information did reduce 
the noncompliance in tax reporting, which indicates that there were unintentional 
errors. The experimental design also allows us to study whether the difficulty and 
novelty of the tax code plays any role in tax compliance. The results indicate that 
tax reporting changes when new and easy information is provided. 
Key words: tax compliance, information, field experiment 
JEL classification numbers: C93, H25, H26 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Informaation roolia on vaikea erotella muista verosääntöjen noudattamiseen 
vaikuttavista asioista. Tässä tutkimuksessa esitellään ainutlaatuista luonnollista 
kenttäkoetta, jonka avulla informaation rooli selviää. Kenttäkokeessa ALV-
velvollisia yrityksiä lähestyttiin kirjeellä, jonka sisältämässä kyselyssä 
tiedusteltiin vastaajan asenteita verottajaa kohtaan. Kysymysten johdannot 
tarjosivat hienovaraisesti ALV-sääntöihin liittyvää tietoa satunnaisesti valitulle 
koeryhmälle. Kontrolliryhmälle vastaavaa tietoa ei jaettu. Informaation 
vaikutukset voidaan nähdä suoraan yksityiskohtaisista yritystason verotiedoista. 
Tulosten perusteella virheet veroilmoittamisessa todella vähenivät, kun 
verosäännöistä jaettiin informaatiota. Koeasetelma mahdollistaa myös 
vastaamisen siihen vaikuttaako tieto eri tavalla, jos kyseessä on uusi tai vaikea 
  
 
verosääntö. Saimme merkitseviä tuloksia vain uudesta ja helposta verosäännöstä 
tarjotusta informaatiosta. 
Asiasanat: verosääntöjen noudattaminen, informaatio, luonnollinen kenttäkoe 
JEL-luokittelu: C93, H25, H26 
1 Introduction
Lack of knowledge about tax rules may explain a substantial part of total
tax non-compliance. As much as 30% of all wrong reporting in income taxes
may be due to honest mistakes (Christian 1994 and Erard 1997). Despite
its importance, the literature on explaining the role of information in tax
compliance is scant (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). In particular, the role of
information in tax non-compliance by firms is unexplored. From observa-
tional data it is impossible to distiguish the effect of information from other
factors affecting tax compliance. Simply providing information about tax
rules to taxpayers also induces other possible changes like an increase in the
perceived probability of being detected.
Some tax codes are easier to comprehend than others. Thus it is inter-
esting to study to what extent the degree of misreporting is related to the
complexity of tax codes. Providing relatively simple information about tax
codes that may be difficult to understand, like marginal tax rates, might
not lead to large behavioral responses (see Chetty and Saez, 2013). This
study contributes by analyzing the effect of separately providing information
about simple, new and complicated tax codes on the tax reporting behavior
of firms. Randomized groups of firms received the different types of informa-
tion in letters as part of a written survey.
We carried out a natural field experiment together with the Finnish Tax
Administration. The idea of the experiment is to separate the role of informa-
tion from other factors affecting the tax compliance of firms. The experiment
consisted of sending letters to randomized control and treatment groups. The
letters included a questionnaire on attitudes towards the tax authority. The
questions candidly provided information about certain key aspects of Finnish
VAT legislation to the treatment group but only enquired about the attitudes
of the control group. Otherwise these two groups were treated in exactly the
same way. Furthermore, we enhanced the likelihood of respondents reading
the questions, since soon after receiving the letter, a polling firm conducted
a telephone survey asking the questions provided earlier in the letter. We
monitor the effects of the treatment on firms’ VAT reporting behavior from
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very detailed monthly level tax records.
The experiment was designed to distinguish the effect of providing infor-
mation about the tax code from other factors affecting compliance because
both the treatment and control groups were contacted by the Finnish Tax
Administration. Without this careful set-up, firms in different groups could
perceive a different increase in their subjective probability of getting caught.
If only the treatment group were contacted, they might expect that the tax
administration would pay special attention to their next tax report. In the
setting of this study, even if the letter had such an effect, it would have been
the same for both treatment and control groups. In this setting the only
difference between the groups is the provision of information.
We provided information to firms facing different types of tax rules in
their normal activities. One group was provided with information about a
relatively simple and new tax rule: the VAT rate for certain services changed
one month before sending the letter. Another group was provided with in-
formation about a relatively complicated VAT rule. By looking into possible
differences in the results across these groups, we can study whether the de-
gree of complexity in information and the complexity of tax rules affect tax
reporting behavior differently.
The results show that providing information on VAT rules can affect firms’
tax reporting behavior. In the groups for which the VAT rate changed, a sub-
stantial number of firms continued reporting at the old VAT rate, although
this VAT rate did not exist for these services any more. Reporting wrongly
is costly for the tax authority, since the mistakes need to be corrected manu-
ally afterwards, and also costly for firms, since they need to go back to their
reports and possibly pay more taxes with interest. We estimate a treatment
effect of 5 percentage points (60%) less wrong reporting for the treatment
group as a result of receiving information about the change in the tax code.
This is a substantial reduction in mistakes. Moreover, this large effect re-
sulted from relatively gentle provision of information as part of a written
survey question.
Providing similar information about a more complicated tax code or a tax
code that has been in place for longer does not produce differing behavior
2
between treatment and control groups. The results on this are not very
consistent, but we infer from this that the complexity of tax codes limits
taxpayers’ ability to react to information. This is natural, because even if
the information about something is clear, it does not affect the receiver if he
or she does not understand the subject the information is about. Moreover, a
tax code that has been in place for prolonged period may be already familiar
to taxpayers and thus providing information about it does not change their
behavior.
Our study is related to Chetty and Saez (2013), who conducted a random-
ized natural experiment to study the effects of highly detailed and illustrative
information about the earned income tax credit (EITC) schedule on earn-
ings decisions. Although taxpayers respond to the salient tax incentives of
whether or not to enrol in the EITC, they do not seem to respond to more
difficult marginal tax rate decisions, despite the clear information given on
these.
We contribute to tax salience literature, which is about the visibility of
tax incentives. In this way the salience of the tax code is closely related
to the extent of information given out on the tax code. More information
makes the tax code more visible. Chetty et al. (2009) analyzed the effect
of tax-inclusive versus tax-exclusive price tags on the demand for goods in
a grocery store. Seeing the tax reduced demand by 8 per cent, suggest-
ing that tax salience matters. Finkelstein (2009) compares electronic and
non-electronic toll collections in the U.S. to study whether salience affects
drivers’ awareness of tolls. She finds that drivers are less aware of electronic
tolls. Abeler and Jäger (2013) conducted a laboratory experiment, which
provided treatments featuring simple and complex tax systems. They show
that subjects in the complex treatment underreact more to taxes relative to
simple treatment. We contribute to the tax salience literature by showing
that providing information about changes in the tax code, which makes these
changes more salient, affects the behavior of taxpayers.
We also contribute more generally to the literature about the role of
information in explaining economic behavior (Dranove et al. 2003, Duflo
and Saez 2003, Jin and Leslie 2003, Hastings and Weinstein 2008, Jensen
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2010, Jones 2010 and Rockoff et al. 2012). We do this by proposing a novel
design where both treatment and control groups are contacted, but only the
treatment group receives the information. For example, Card et al. (2012)
found that providing information on peer salaries affects employees earning
below the median. They report lower pay and job satisfaction and are more
likely to search for a new job. It could be an interesting addition to know to
what extent workers would react to a mere contact as opposed to receiving
information about others’ salaries.
The paper proceeds by describing the relevant institutions in section 2.
Section 3 presents the experimental design in detail. Section 4 describes the
data and section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 The Finnish VAT System and the Filing Prac-
tices for Firms
The experiment was conducted in Finland, which is a member of the Euro-
pean Union (EU). The consumption tax system in the EU is value-added tax
(VAT).1 According to EU directives, member states may apply at most four
separate VAT rates: a general rate of at least 15%, at most two reduced rates
and a zero rate. The directives name the commodities allowed to be taxed at
one of the reduced rates. Consumer prices within the EU are tax-inclusive.
Price tags already include VAT.
Each firm must report their value-added taxes using periodic tax returns.2
In addition to value-added taxes, employers’ contributions are also reported
using this form. In each period (month or quarter) a firm reports the sum
of VAT separately by different VAT bases to the tax authority. The form
also includes specific slots for certain specific taxes like reversed VAT for the
construction industry. Firms also report their wage sums and other taxes on
1The other commonly used consumption tax is retail sales tax (RST). For a discussion
about the relative merits of RST and VAT, see Zodrow (1999).
2Reporting takes place monthly, quarterly or yearly depending on the turnover of the
firm. If it exceeds 50,000€ per year, the reporting must be done monthly. Otherwise it is
done quarterly unless the turnover per year is less than or equal to 25,000€.
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the same form. Figure 18 in the appendix presents the periodic tax returns
form. The information on the form is recorded in the firm’s own tax account,
which the tax authority may check for inconsistencies.
VAT must be reported before a strict deadline. The deadline is one and
a half months after the end of the period which the report covers. There
are two ways to report VAT: electronically or by a regular mail. If the firm
uses the more popular electronic system, it must report by the 12th day of
the second month from the end of the period. For example, the VAT related
to November 2011 must be reported by January 12 the following year. For
firms that report using regular mail, the corresponding day is the 7th.
The firms report information in their periodic tax returns to the tax
authority. This holds even if a firm uses external accounting services. Then
the external firm keeps the firm’s accounts, but does not report VAT to the
tax authority. Moreover, firms are responsible for collecting VAT from their
customers on each transaction they make. For example, when a barber shop
sells a service (at a VAT-inclusive price) it first records this transaction in
its cash register and only afterwards reports its transaction to its accounting
firm.
The law on VAT may be complicated. The Finnish VAT law is 159 pages
long and includes many special cases about which VAT base should be applied
for a particular good or service. The tax administration provides instructions
for periodic tax returns. These are 16 pages long and in many cases also refer
to the internet for more detailed instructions.
Next we describe the relevant features for this study of the tax code
for some labor-intensive services (barbers, masseurs and beauty salons), the
construction industry and the restaurant industry that we focus on.
Reduced VAT rate for labor-intensive services
There was a VAT reform for labor-intensive services at the beginning of 2007.
The reduced VAT rate of 9% applied to them until December 2011. From the
beginning of January 2012 the reduced rate was abolished and the general
rate of 23% applied instead.
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As one outcome we examine whether firms reported at the wrong VAT
rate. The tax authority observes the reported VAT by the rate. Therefore,
where the rate does not apply for a particular firm, it is straightforward to
detect false reporting. Furthermore, since the firms themselves report their
VAT by rate they must understand that reporting at the wrong rate is easily
detected.
Reversed VAT and regular VAT obligations in the construction
industry
Normally the provider of a product is responsible for collecting the VAT and
consequently reports it to the tax authority. However, with reversed VAT
it is the buyer firm that is responsible for collecting and reporting the VAT.
Reversed VAT responsibility applies to construction services in Finland. This
practice took effect from April 2011.
The conditions where reversed VAT responsibility is applied are far from
self-evident. What complicates the law is the fact that within the construc-
tion industry it applies only to some services. This depends both on the
nature of the buyer and the service being sold. If the service does not fulfill
the criteria, the regular VAT procedure is applied instead. For instance, in
order for reversed VAT to be applied in the construction industry, the buyer
firm must practice construction work more often than occasionally.
Reduced VAT and regular VAT rates in the restaurant industry
From July 2010 the reduced VAT rate of 13% has been applied to restaurant
services (food). For other sales in restaurants, like sales of beer, newspapers
or magazine, VAT is paid at the general rate of 23%. The two different rates
could potentially lead to mistakes. The system is relatively well established,
takeaway food from restaurants having been taxed at a reduced rate for a long
time in Finland. Food sold inside restaurants was switched to the reduced
rate from the main rate. Still, the VAT rules for restaurants are relatively
old and easy for firms to comprehend.
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3 Experimental Design
We carried out a natural field experiment in order to study the role of infor-
mation in tax compliance. We first chose industries (labor-intensive services,
the construction industry and the restaurant industry) for which we pro-
vided information about the VAT rules. We randomly selected firms from
tax records into the treatment and control groups.
The Finnish Tax Administration contacted both groups by letter, which
included a written survey questionnaire about attitudes towards the tax au-
thority. The letter candidly provided information about VAT rules among
the questions to the treatment group. For the control group there was no
such information, only the questions. The firms did not know that they were
participating in an information experiment. They thought they were menery
answering questions about attitudes towards the Finnish Tax Administra-
tion.
Our design, where we contact both the treatment and the control groups,
allows us to separate the effect of the information from that of the contact
only. In order to enhance the likehood of a respondent reading the questions,
a polling firm collected the answers to the survey by phone right after the
firms received the letters.
Timing
We compare firms in the treatment and control group before and after the
experiment. The timeline of the experiment is depicted in Figure 1.
The experiment took place in the beginning of 2012. The tax administra-
tion contacted 2000 firms with the survey questionnaire, which entrepreneurs
received in the second half of January 2012 (see Figure 1). At that time
the latest reporting dates for November 2011 taxes had already gone and
therefore it is not possible for our treatments to have affected reporting for
November 2011.
The first time our treatments might show up is in the reports for Decem-
ber 2011. We can see whether receiving a letter has any effect on post-letter
reporting by comparing the outcomes in the treatment and control groups.
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Mar. 7 and
Mar. 12
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Jan. 2012
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received
letters
Survey
conducted
by phone
(Jan. 30−
Feb. 17)
Figure 1: Timeline of the experiment
For labor-intensive services in particular we expect firms to react in their
reports for January 2012, since the information was about the VAT reform
that took place then. The data allows us to monitor when potential effects
show up, since the tax records show by date when the firms report their
taxes.
Structure of the survey
We put different survey questions to the treated firms in the three sectors:
labor-intensive services, construction sector and restaurants. The corre-
sponding control groups received similar questions.3 Each of these surveys
included a cover letter and three different sets of questions: the first set re-
lated to attitudes towards the tax authority (see Table 7), the second set
provided information to the treatment group, but not to the control group
and the third set asked about background information (see Table 8). The
treatment and control group questions were the same, except for the second
set of questions.
The cover letter provided general information to the respondents, like
the purpose of the survey and the estimated time needed to answer the
questions. It also emphasized that the survey should be completed by the
3For each industry the treatment and the control group were of the same size.
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person responsible for taxation issues in the firm. By stating this explicitly
in the cover letter we try to make it less likely that the survey would be
redirected to an accounting firm, because otherwise the entrepreneurs (who
are responsible for their taxation) might not have got the information.
The control group questions neither provided information on periodic tax
returns nor did they direct respondents in the control group to find out about
the tax rules by themselves. The second set of questions asked the control
group, e.g. the following: What service provider do you use for electronic
reporting? Have you had difficulties in logging on to the electronic tax re-
porting system? Where have you searched for information about periodic
tax reporting?
For the treatment group the second set of questions differed as between in-
dustries (labor-intensive services, construction sector and restaurants). These
questions provided information about periodic tax returns of likely relevance
to the respondents. We describe the information in detail below. An im-
portant feature in our design is that we can relate each specific piece of
information within a question to a corresponding slot in the periodic tax
return form. This allows us to deduce which piece of information has caused
the observed changes in tax reporting.
Our results are based on the estimation of the following equation:
Yft = αTRft + βAFTERft + γTRft ∗AFTERft + µt + νf + εft (1)
Yft is the value of the dependent variable for firm f in period t. AFTER
and TR are indicators of whether the observation is after the treatment and
whether the firm is assigned to the treatment group. The most interesting
parameter is γ, which stands for the difference-in-differences coefficient. µt
and νf capture the month and firm fixed effects and ε is an error term, which
captures all the other things not included in the equation, also those we
cannot observe.
With observational data, correlation between the error term and the treat-
ment status would bias the treatment effect estimates. In our design this does
not matter, because for the identification of our natural field experiment we
only need the treatment status to be randomly assigned. Even if there were
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some differences between the treatment and control groups, our randomized
(information) treatment allows us to identify the treatment effect, γ. Our
treatment operates as a shock for the firm and by estimating the above equa-
tion we can determine the effect of it.
In order to identify the effect of information provision, we contacted both
the treatment and the control groups. Because we provided no information
to the control group, any reaction by this group would have been due to
the contact alone. The reaction in the treatment group is a combination of
information provision and the contact. Therefore the difference between the
changes in the treatment and the control group provides us with an estimate
for the reaction to the information provision, γˆ.
Our results would be confounded if approaching the control group had
induced them to check their tax code more closely. We think that this is
unlikely, since the control group questions were more about attitudes towards
the tax administration and the electronic reporting system than hinting at
the tax code. We perform robustness checks after the main results to check
whether approaching the control group by letters somehow changed their
behavior.
Reduced VAT rate for labor-intensive services
We provided information about the VAT reform to firms engaged in labor-
intensive services. Table 9 shows a snapshot of the survey question containing
the information. In this question we drew attention to the main fact (the
VAT reform) by stating that: “The VAT test period for labor-intensive ser-
vices ended on December 31, 2011.” The question then continues with more
specific information about the VAT reform.4 After the introductory part of
the question comes the actual question: “Will the number of tax rates in your
firm change from the present number?” The purpose of this question was to
prompt the entrepreneur to think about her own tax reporting.
4It explains that, although some services like haircutting or beard-trimming used to be
taxed at the 9% rate and some services like trimming eyelashes or eyebrows at the general
rate of 23%, from the beginning of 2012 these will all be taxed at the general rate and
that the reduced rate no longer applies.
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If all firms engaged in labor-intensive services both knew the new tax
rules and obeyed them, we would observe no reporting at the old 9% rate
after the change. Instead they should have reported only at the 23% VAT
rate. If some firms were unaware of the change, this would be evident in
their tax reports.
Reversed VAT in construction industry
For firms in the construction industry our information treatment consists of
four questions each dealing with the reversed VAT obligation. Their structure
is very similar to that for labor-intensive services described above. Each
question first briefly provides information on the reversed VAT obligation,
then this information is given in more detail and finally the questions prompt
the firms to think about their own tax reporting.
There are separate sections in the periodic tax return form for cases where
reversed VAT applies (318, 319 and 320) and for those where it does not (301).
In order to relate to the right sections in the periodic tax return form, our
questions not only provide information about what activities are taxed at
each rate, they also explain the exact sections where they are reported. For
example, one of the questions says that: “... If the buyer does not satisfy the
above criteria [for the reversed VAT obligation], the seller shall report the
VAT in section 301. Otherwise the seller reports only the tax-exempt price
in section 319”. If our treatments change the tax reporting behavior of firms
in the construction industry, the reaction should especially be seen as a shift
between reporting in sections 301 and 319.
Reduced VAT and regular VAT in the restaurant industry
For firms in the restaurant industry the two most relevant tax rates are the
general rate and the reduced rate of 13%. Two of the information treatments
provide information about the distinction between what sales are to be taxed
at each of these two tax rates.
VAT must be reported in different sections for each rate: VAT at the 23%
rate is reported in section 301 and VAT at the 13% rate in section 302. If
11
firms in the restaurant industry react to this information, this reaction ought
to be due to a change in reporting in sections 301 and 302.
4 Data Description
The data we use are tax register data from the Finnish Tax Administration.
They contain a panel of monthly level tax records from every firm whose tax
liability is registered in Finland. The tax register data contain information
about everything the firms report to the tax authority. The survey data
consist of the responses to the survey questions collected via phone interviews
and the data on tax returns for all the firms which received the letters. Table
1 provides some key details of the data.
Table 1: About the data
Firms Resp. rate Obs. Producer price turnover
Labor-intensive services 600 39% 16422 3628€
Construction industry 800 37% 19070 5410€
Restaurant industry 600 26% 17112 7314€
The first column in Table 1 shows the number of firms randomized into
each letter group. Half of these firms in each industry are randomly selected
to the treatment group and the other half to the control group. The second
column gives the response rates to the phone interview. It shows that firms in
labor-intensive services and the construction industry answered the questions
more often than those in the restaurant industry. In total 684 firms out of
2000 responded to the survey, making the response rate 34.2%.
Our dataset includes all the information on the firm-level tax returns,
such as the entire VAT records (at different rates, reversed VAT etc.), em-
ployers’ contributions, industry classification and the reporting dates. The
tax return data are from January 2010 to July 2012, resulting in between
15,000 and 20,000 observations for each industry (column 3 in Table 1). The
last column in Table 1 shows the average monthly producer price turnover
for each industry. The restaurant industry is the largest in turnover size and
labor-intensive services the smallest.
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Figure 2: Average VAT at the 9% and 23% VAT rates
Figures 2 - 4 describe the evolution of the most relevant VAT-related
numbers for each of the three industries. Figure 2 shows the evolution of
average monthly VAT in labor-intensive services at the 9% and 23% tax
rates. The figure shows that in the beginning of 2012 average tax reports
at the 9% rate decreased to close to zero. At the same time average VAT
reports at the 23% rate increased substabtially. This pattern clearly shows
the effect of the reform - the abolition of the 9% rate for these services.
Figure 3 shows average producer price turnover in regular and reversed
VAT transactions for firms in the construction industry. The figure shows
that because reversed VAT was introduced in April 2011, reporting in section
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Figure 3: Average turnover with regular and reversed VAT
319 was zero before that. After its introduction some of the reporting at
regular VAT clearly shifted to reporting at reversed VAT.
Figure 4 plots the average tax reports at the two most relevant VAT rates
in the restaurant industry, the 13% reduced rate and the 23% general rate.
The reduced rate for restaurant meals was introduced in July 2010. As a
response to this, the figure shows a sharp increase in VAT reports at the 13%
rate and a reduction in VAT reports at the 23% rate in July 2010. However,
at the time of our experiment, in the beginning of 2012, there is no visible
deviation from the general time trends.
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Figure 4: Average VAT at the 13% and 23% rates
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5 Results
5.1 Labor-intensive services
This section presents the results for labor-intensive services. The information
in the treatment was about the VAT reform, where the VAT rate for these
services increased from 9% to 23%. This change in the tax code took effect
on January 2012. After that these firms should not have reported at the
reduced VAT rate. Instead they should have charged VAT on their services
at the standard 23% rate and reported to the tax authority at that rate.
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Figure 5: Fraction of firms in labor-intensive services reporting at the 9%
reduced rate
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Figure 6: Fractions of firms reporting with 9% reduced rate in December
2011 (left graph) and January 2012 (right graph)
We first study the effect of providing information about the reform on
the fraction of firms making the mistake of reporting at the reduced rate
after it no longer existed. Figure 5 shows the fraction of firms reporting
non-zero sales at the 9% tax rate. Before the change in the tax rule most
firms reported at the reduced rate. Moreover, firms in the two groups had a
similar fraction of reports, although a slightly larger fraction of firms reported
at the 9% rate in the treatment group (79.4% in December 2011) than in
the control group (75.9% in December 2011).5 The time trends are similar
between the groups. Thus the difference between groups does not jeopardize
identification, since we use the DID estimator. This takes into account the
pre-treatment difference between the groups.
In the beginning of 2012 the fraction of firms reporting at the 9% VAT
rate drops significantly in response to the reform. However, a non-trivial
fraction of firms still reported at the 9% rate in January, although that
rate was no longer available for these firms. Figure 6 shows that for the
control group the fraction making the mistake is 8.5% (right graph). For
5The difference between groups is not statistically significant (p-value 0.27) when com-
paring observations in December 2011, whereas for all the observations for 2010 and 2011
the difference is statistically significant (p-value 1.5e-7).
17
−
0.
15
−
0.
10
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
Treatment vs control
D
iff
e
re
n
ce
 o
f f
ra
ct
io
ns
 re
po
rti
ng
 a
t 9
%
 ra
te
2011 2012
Au
gu
st
Se
pt
em
be
r
O
ct
ob
er
N
ov
e
m
be
r
D
ec
em
be
r
Ja
nu
a
ry
Fe
br
u
a
ry
Figure 7: Difference between treatment and control group fractions of firms
reporting at the 9% rate
the treatment group, the fraction making the mistake is only 3.3%. This
descriptive difference suggests a treatment effect of 5 percentage points due
to receiving the information. Furthermore, the order between the treatment
and control groups is reversed from the end of 2011 (see Figure 6). This
implies that the true treatment effect could be even larger than 5 percentage
points. Figure 7 shows the differences between the treatment and control
groups from August 2011 to January 2012. The difference in January 2012
is negative, whereas in February 2012 it is essentially zero and statistically
insignificant. The latter fact arises because the errors in both groups go to
18
close to zero. This is because the tax authority regularly checks suspicious
reports and would have had time to correct them by February.
To measure the exact size of the treatment effects shown in Figure 5, we
run regressions measuring the size of the difference between the treatment
and control groups. Table 2 shows the difference and difference-in-differences
(DID) estimates for the effect of information on false reports in January 2012.
Column “1/2012” shows the difference between the treatment and control
groups in January 2012. The treatment group had 5 percentage points less
false reports, and this difference is statistically significant.
We perform DID estimation to control for potential differences in the
treatment and control groups prior to the experiment. The corresponding
columns in the table give the DID estimates with four different time spans.
We further show results varying the control vector, either including month
or firm fixed effects. The DID estimates are in the third row. The first DID
estimates (“12/2011-1/2012”) use the observations for December 2011 and
January 2012 and the corresponding columns use wider time spans. These
different DID estimates indicate that the treatment effect is negative, the
coefficients ranging between -5% and -10%. All these point estimates are
statistically significant.
The treatment effect of providing information on making a mistake in
tax reporting is large. The treatment effect estimates imply a more than
50% reduction in the rate of making a mistake. Given that the information
was provided in a letter accompanying the questions, this strong effect is
intriguing. This kind of method for information provision is not particularly
strong. It does not highlight the information being provided. Therefore this
result suggests that the tax authorities may have wanted to better inform
taxpayers about the changes in the tax code. It is a relatively low cost
operation to send targeted letters. The effect found here suggests there are
benefits acting this way.6
The effect of providing information to firms in this setting was only tem-
porary. The number of firms making a mistake goes to zero after January.
This is because the tax authority made a desk audit of those firms that made
6The total number of firms in our sample making the mistake is less than 50.
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Figure 8: Average VAT at the 9% rate for treatment (solid line) and control
(dashed line) groups
a suspicious entry in their tax account. However, it is entirely possible that
in another setting firms would have continued making the mistake for longer.
In any case, it was costly for the tax authority to have to carry out desk
audits of firms making the mistake. It would have been less costly for the
tax authority to inform all firms affected by the reform about the reform
before it took place.
We next study the extent to which the treatment affected the average
VAT firms reported at different VAT rates. Figure 8 shows the average VAT
reports at the 9% rate for both the treatment group (solid line) and the
21
control group (dashed line). Before the reform the groups have very similar
trends. Table 3 shows that for some time periods the difference between the
groups is statistically significant, but not always. In the beginning of 2012,
average VAT at the 9% rate drops, corresponding to the discontinuation
of the 9% VAT rate, and is close to zero from there on for both groups.
Table 3 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the
treatment and control groups in 2012. We find no effect from the treatment
on average VAT at the 9% rate. This indicates that although there were false
reports at this rate in January 2012, the magnitude of these effects was not
very large.
Figure 9 shows average VAT at the general 23% rate for the treatment
and control groups. VAT in the treatment group displays a similar trend to
that of the control group, both before and after the change. In some periods
the difference between the groups is statistically significant (see Table 4).
Due to the change in the tax rules average VAT at the 23% rate increases
sharply in both groups, but according to Table 4 this change does not differ
between the groups.7
Table 3: Difference and Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Dependent variable: VAT at 9% reduced rate
Independent variables 2010 2011 2012 2010 - 2012
Firm is in treatment group -17.5*** -6.7 -0.7 -11.9**
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (6.6) (6.3) (1.8) (4.0)
Year 2012 -223.6***
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (15.8)
Treatment group and year 2012 (DID estimate) 11.3
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (8.5)
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 6177 6565 3680 16422
Notes. ***, ** and * denote significance levels 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Including firm fixed effects
does not change the qualitative result of DID estimation.
7Especially in January 2012 average VAT seems to be somewhat higher in the control
group than in the treatment group, but this difference is not statistically significant. The
difference estimate when comparing the averages in January 2012 is -51.4€ with a p-value
of 0.6. The difference-in-differences (DID) estimate when comparing the treatment and
control groups in December 2011 and January 2012 is -80.7€ with a p-value of 0.4.
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Figure 9: Average VAT at 23% rate for the treatment (solid line) and control
(dashed line) groups
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Table 4: Difference and Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Dependent variable: VAT at 23% reduced rate
Independent variables 2010 2011 2012 2010 - 2012
Firm is in treatment group -36.3** -6.7 -25.2 60.9***
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (11.4) (10.6) (25.3) (9.2)
Year 2012 504.1***
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (36.0)
Treatment group and year 2012 (DID estimate) -21.7
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (19.3)
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 6177 6565 3680 16422
Notes. ***, ** and * denote significance levels 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Including firm fixed effects
does not change the qualitative result of the DID estimation.
5.2 Construction industry
This section studies the effects of the information treatment on the reporting
behavior related to the reversed VAT obligation in the construction indus-
try. Figure 10 plots the average turnover with reversed VAT responsibility
for both the treatment and control groups. The figure shows the effect of
initiating the reversed reporting system in April 2011 as a rapid increase in
reporting within the reversed system. The data for reversed VAT reporting is
quite messy and there are substantial changes in the series over time. There
appears to be a difference between the groups at the time of the experiment
in January and February 2012. However, Table 5, reporting the estimation
results, shows that this difference is not statistically significant and is there-
fore likely to be just noise. After that there are no clear differences.
It is worth noting that due to the magnitude of standard errors8, the
average effects should be half of the original reporting in order for us to
detect any treatment effect. An increase in reporting by 50% would be a
radical change and that is something our relatively gentle treatment is not
capable of providing. We find no evidence of a strong effect but cannot rule
8There is lot of variation in the underlying distributions. For example, in January 2012
there are 590 observations, 436 (74%) of which are zeros and the two largest observations
are about 130000€ and 42000€.
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Figure 10: Average turnover with reversed VAT responsibility
out small effects either.
We tried to make the standard errors smaller by including costs, de-
ductions and wages of a firm as control variables. The standard errors of
difference and DID estimates did not change much and the reduction was
at most only about five percent in tables 5 and 6. In some cases standard
errors even increased. None of the difference and DID estimates becomes
statistically significant due to inclusion of the control variables.
In Figure 11 we plot the average VAT tax reporting at the regular VAT
rate for the treatment (solid line) and the control group (dashed line). The
potential treatment effect should show up in early 2012. The average for the
25
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Figure 11: Average VAT at regular VAT rate
treatment group is smaller than that for the control group, but the difference
is not statistically significant (see Table 6). In addition, the treatment group
has lower reports already prior to the experiment. Therefore, the DID esti-
mates in Table 6 are essentially zero. The power calculation indicates that
in order for us to detect an effect, there should have been a change of about
a third in the treatment group.
Let us next study something that might be less volatile than average VAT,
namely the fractions of firms reporting under different sections (319 and 301).
Figure 12 shows the fraction of firms with non-zero reporting in section 319.
After April 2011 the evolution of the fractions was similar in both groups. In
27
the beginning of 2012, at the time when our treatment should show up, the
fractions hardly differ at all. The regression results also confirm that there
is no sign of our treatment in reporting with the reversed VAT obligation.9
Figure 13 shows the fraction of firms with non-zero reporting at the reg-
ular VAT rate (section 301). Although the fraction is lower for the treatment
group than for the control group in January and February 2012, the difference
is not statistically significant. Nor are the DID estimates in the regressions
corresponding to those in tables 5 and 6. Thus there is no evidence of the
treatment effect here.
There are multiple possible explanations for the messy results. First, this
particular tax code might be too difficult for firms to understand. The tax
code is indeed very complex and full of exceptions. Second, it is possible
that the firms already knew the information provided, because the reversed
VAT obligation had already been in place for more than half a year when our
experiment took place. Third, the way we provided the information in the
letters might not have been strong enough to allow the respondent to absorb
the information. Fourth, it is possible that the firms were simply reluctant
to change their behavior despite the new information.
Our results would have been confounded if the experiment had induced
the firms in the control group to find out about the tax rules by themselves.
To control for this possibility we compare the reporting of control group
firms with those firms to which we did not send a letter. The comparisons
between the control group firms and those which were not contacted show
no differences. Therefore the contact did not affect tax reporting behavior
in the control group.
Even if our treatments had succeeded in terms of information provision,
the zero average effects might still have shown up as a result of two simulta-
neous effects: some firms may have shifted reporting from the reversed VAT
to regular VAT or vice versa. We studied the distributions of the reports, but
did not find any sign of changes in the shape of the distributions indicating
such behavior. Therefore, our result for the construction industry cannot be
9The difference and DID estimates corresponding to those in tables 5 and 6 do not
differ statistically significantly from zero.
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Figure 12: Fraction of firms in the construction industry reporting in section
319
explained by these two opposite reactions canceling each other out.
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Figure 13: Fraction of firms in the construction industry reporting in section
301
31
5.3 Restaurant industry
This section concentrates on tax reporting in the restaurant industry. The
information treatment is about clarifying which services are subject to which
VAT base. The reduced rate has been employed since July 2010.
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Figure 14: Average VAT at the reduced rate
Figure 14 shows VAT reports at the 13% and figure 15 at the 23% VAT
rate for the restaurant industry in the treatment and control groups from July
2010 to July 2012. A potential treatment effect is that the firms switched
from reporting at the general rate to reporting at the reduced rate. The effect
should show up in the beginning of 2012. The figures indicate no treatment
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Figure 15: Average VAT at the general rate
effect on average VAT reports. The regression results also show no sign of the
treatment effect. None of the difference and DID estimates corresponding to
those in tables 5 and 6 are statistically significant.
Figure 16 (17) shows the fraction of firms with non-zero reporting at the
reduced (general) rate. No statistically significant change takes place in the
beginning of 2012 in the treatment group compared to the control group.10
As a result of our information treatments some firms might have changed
10Again, none of the difference and DID estimates is statistically significant in the
regressions corresponding to tables 5 and 6. Including costs, deductions and wages as
control variables for the regressions does not reduce the standard errors of difference and
DID estimates much, at most by about ten percent. The reduction does not make any of
these estimates statistically significant.
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Figure 16: Fraction of firms in the restaurant industry reporting in section
302
from 13% to 23% and others from 23% to 13%. We studied the evolution of
the distributions of reports at 13% and 23% to see whether this is the case or
not. We do not find any evidence of these two possible simultaneous effects,
which might have cancelled each other out.
In summary, we could not find any treatment effect for the restaurant
industry. Because the reduced rate had been in place about 18 months before
our experiment, it is likely that restaurants have already become acquainted
with the relevant tax rules. It is, however, also possible that it is due to our
treatment providing the information inadequately or that the tax code itself
is too difficult to understand.
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Figure 17: Fraction of firms in the restaurant industry reporting in section
301
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6 Conclusions
We conducted a randomized field experiment to study the role of informa-
tion in firms’ tax compliance. The information treatment in the experiment
was to candidly provide information about VAT rules to reporting firms. A
letter to the firms contained a survey on attitudes towards the Finnish Tax
Administration. For a randomly chosen treatment group the letter provided
information about the tax code among the questions in the letter. For a ran-
domly chosen control group the letter provided similar questions without this
information. In this way the experiment tested the effectiveness of providing
information. Both groups were otherwise treated in the same way.
We estimated the treatment effect of informing labor-intensive firms about
a VAT reform. The reform removed a reduced VAT rate for certain services.
A non-trivial fraction of firms made the mistake of continuing to report at
the reduced rate, even after it ceased to exist. Our information treatment
induced the firms to make the mistake more than 5 percentage points less
often. This more than halved the mistakes compared to the control group.
This is a very large behavioral response from relatively gentle information
provision.
We looked at other cases where the tax codes either have not changed for
a while or are more complex. We provided information about the tax codes
that are relevant for the firms which received the information. We did not
find any clear effects from these other types of information. The reason for
the statistically insignificant results is the very noisy data. There is a lot of
heterogeneity in the VAT reports for firms and great variance over time. The
treatment effect should be very large for us to observe it.
Despite the noise in the data, our results suggest that firms facing changes
in their tax regime are prone to make mistakes in their reporting. Incorrect
reports are truly mistakes and not intentional tax noncompliance. Moreover,
it seems that a large share of these mistakes would not have occurred if the
firms had been better informed about the change in the VAT law. Since it
is a relatively low-cost policy to send information letters, the tax authorities
may want to consider adopting this policy. Our results support the idea
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that right time to inform taxpayers about rules is when there are changes
in them. In other periods it seems difficult to obtain clear benefits from
targeted information treatments.
Our results are in line with earlier studies which show that the provision
of easy information is observed to be effective (Chetty et al . 2009 and Card
et al . 2012). Studies providing more difficult information, especially on
the EITC schedule,11 have not found equally strong reactions to information
provision (Jones 2010 and Chetty and Saez 2013). Abeler and Jäger (2013)
show that in a laboratory subjects underreact to new taxes in a complex
environment.
We provide a novel experimental design, where both treatment and con-
trol groups are contacted. This allows us to separate the effect of information
from that of the contact. The (information) treatment is mediated using a
survey. Our design might also be useful in other contexts, where it is impor-
tant both to separate the treatment effect from that of the contact and for
the subjects to be treated without letting them know they are participating
in an experiment.
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Appendix
The appendix provides additional details related to the survey. It first shows
in Figure 18 the form for the Periodic Tax Returns. Tables 7 and 8 show the
first and the third set of questions - those about the attitudes towards the
tax authority and about background of a firm. An example of the second set
of questions is given in Table 9.
39
S
e
n
d
 c
o
m
p
le
te
d
 f
o
rm
 t
o
:
F
IN
N
IS
H
 T
A
X
 A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
P
O
 B
o
x
  
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
3
 V
E
R
O
P
E
R
IO
D
IC
 T
A
X
 R
E
T
U
R
N
K
If
 m
a
k
in
g
 c
o
rr
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 t
o
 a
n
 e
a
rl
ie
r
fi
li
n
g
, 
p
le
a
s
e
 o
n
ly
 s
u
b
m
it
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
a
m
o
u
n
ts
 i
n
s
te
a
d
 o
f 
fu
ll
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
.
D
o
 n
o
t 
s
e
n
d
 a
n
y
 e
n
c
lo
s
u
re
s
 w
it
h
th
e
 P
e
ri
o
d
ic
 t
a
x
 r
e
tu
rn
 f
o
rm
.
T
a
x
p
a
y
e
r'
s
 n
a
m
e
0
1
0
 B
u
s
in
e
s
s
 I
D
 o
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
id
e
n
ti
ty
 n
u
m
b
e
r
V
A
L
U
E
 A
D
D
E
D
 T
A
X
E
M
P
L
O
Y
E
R
S
' 
C
O
N
T
R
IB
U
T
IO
N
S
0
5
0
 R
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0
5
0
 R
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0
5
2
 P
e
ri
o
d
 i
n
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
0
5
3
 Y
e
a
r
0
5
2
 P
e
ri
o
d
 i
n
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
0
5
3
 Y
e
a
r
M
o
n
th
-
ly
M
o
n
th
ly
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
Y
e
a
rl
y
4
2
e
u
ro
c
e
n
ts
e
u
ro
c
e
n
ts
T
a
x
 o
n
 d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 s
a
le
s
 b
y
 t
a
x
 r
a
te
6
0
1
W
a
g
e
s
/o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
u
b
je
c
t 
to
 w
it
h
h
o
ld
in
g
3
0
1
2
3
 %
 t
a
x
6
0
2
T
a
x
 w
it
h
h
e
ld
3
0
2
1
3
 %
 t
a
x
6
0
5
W
a
g
e
s
/o
th
e
r 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 
s
u
b
je
c
t 
to
 t
a
x
 a
t 
s
o
u
rc
e
3
0
3
9
 %
 t
a
x
3
0
5
T
a
x
 o
n
 g
o
o
d
s
 p
u
rc
h
a
s
e
d
 
fr
o
m
 o
th
e
r 
E
U
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s
6
0
6
T
a
x
 a
t 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
n
 w
a
g
e
s
/ 
o
th
e
r 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
3
0
6
T
a
x
 o
n
 s
e
rv
ic
e
s
 p
u
rc
h
a
s
e
d
 
fr
o
m
 o
th
e
r 
E
U
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s
6
0
9
W
a
g
e
s
 s
u
b
je
c
t 
to
 s
o
c
ia
l 
s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
6
1
0
S
o
c
ia
l 
s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
p
a
y
a
b
le
T
a
x
 o
n
 c
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
 s
e
rv
ic
e
s
p
u
rc
h
a
s
e
d
 (
re
v
e
rs
e
 c
h
a
rg
e
)
3
1
8
P
e
ri
o
d
 o
f 
n
o
 w
a
g
e
 p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
0
5
4
 
0
5
6
 
3
0
7
T
a
x
 d
e
d
u
c
ti
b
le
 f
o
r 
p
e
ri
o
d
 
in
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
P
e
ri
o
d
 -
P
e
ri
o
d
 -
0
5
5
 Y
e
a
r
0
5
7
 Y
e
a
r
s
ta
rt
e
n
d
K
3
1
7
A
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
V
A
T
 r
e
lie
f
T
a
x
 p
a
y
a
b
le
 /
 
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 t
a
x
 t
h
a
t 
q
u
a
li
fi
e
s
 
fo
r 
re
fu
n
d
 (
-)
3
0
8
3
0
9
S
a
le
s
 t
a
x
a
b
le
 a
t 
z
e
ro
 V
A
T
 r
a
te
3
1
1
S
a
le
s
 o
f 
g
o
o
d
s
 t
o
 
o
th
e
r 
E
U
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s
3
1
2
S
a
le
s
 o
f 
s
e
rv
ic
e
s
 t
o
o
th
e
r 
E
U
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s
3
1
3
P
u
rc
h
a
s
e
s
 o
f 
g
o
o
d
s
 f
ro
m
 
o
th
e
r 
E
U
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s
3
1
4
P
u
rc
h
a
s
e
s
 o
f 
s
e
rv
ic
e
s
 f
ro
m
o
th
e
r 
E
U
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s
3
1
9
S
a
le
s
 o
f 
c
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
 s
e
rv
ic
e
s
(r
e
v
e
rs
e
 c
h
a
rg
e
)
F
o
r 
ta
x
p
a
y
e
rs
 w
it
h
in
 V
A
T
 r
e
li
e
f 
s
c
h
e
m
e
e
u
ro
c
e
n
ts
P
u
rc
h
a
s
e
s
 o
f 
c
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
s
e
rv
ic
e
s
 (
re
v
e
rs
e
 c
h
a
rg
e
)
3
2
0
3
1
5
S
a
le
s
 t
h
a
t 
q
u
a
lif
y
 f
o
r 
V
A
T
 r
e
lie
f
N
o
 V
A
T
 a
c
ti
v
it
y
P
e
ri
o
d
 -
P
e
ri
o
d
 -
0
5
4
 
0
5
6
 
0
5
5
 Y
e
a
r
0
5
7
 Y
e
a
r
s
ta
rt
e
n
d
T
a
x
 t
h
a
t 
q
u
a
lif
ie
s
 f
o
r 
V
A
T
 r
e
lie
f
3
1
6
A
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
V
A
T
 r
e
lie
f
(t
ra
n
s
fe
r 
to
 l
in
e
 3
1
7
)
D
a
te
S
ig
n
a
tu
re
 a
n
d
 p
ri
n
te
d
 n
a
m
e
0
4
2
 T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
V
E
R
O
H
 4
0
0
1
e
/1
  
1
.2
0
1
2
K
S
e
n
d
 c
o
m
p
le
te
d
 f
o
rm
 t
o
:
F
IN
N
IS
H
 T
A
X
 A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
P
O
 B
o
x
  
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
3
 V
E
R
O
P
E
R
IO
D
IC
 T
A
X
 R
E
T
U
R
N
 (
p
a
g
e
 2
)
M
If
 m
a
k
in
g
 c
o
rr
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 t
o
 a
n
 e
a
rl
ie
r 
fi
li
n
g
,
p
le
a
s
e
 o
n
ly
 s
u
b
m
it
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
in
s
te
a
d
 o
f 
fu
ll
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
.
D
o
 n
o
t 
s
e
n
d
 a
n
y
 e
n
c
lo
s
u
re
s
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 P
e
ri
o
d
ic
 t
a
x
 r
e
tu
rn
 f
o
rm
.
T
a
x
p
a
y
e
r'
s
 n
a
m
e
0
1
0
 B
u
s
in
e
s
s
 I
D
 o
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
id
e
n
ti
ty
 n
u
m
b
e
r
T
A
X
 R
E
T
U
R
N
 F
O
R
 O
T
H
E
R
 U
N
-P
R
O
M
P
T
E
D
 T
A
X
E
S
P
le
a
s
e
 e
n
te
r 
ty
p
e
 o
f 
ta
x
 (
c
o
d
e
 n
u
m
b
e
rs
 f
ro
m
 l
is
t 
b
e
lo
w
),
 r
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
, 
ta
x
a
b
le
 p
e
ri
o
d
 i
n
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
,
y
e
a
r,
 a
n
d
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
ta
x
 p
a
y
a
b
le
.
4
2
1
0
1
6
2
4
2
5
6
8
9
2
3
9
6
9
8
4
L
o
tt
e
ry
 t
a
x
T
a
x
 o
n
 i
n
s
u
ra
n
c
e
 p
re
m
iu
m
s
A
m
o
u
n
t 
w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 p
u
rc
h
a
s
e
 p
ri
c
e
 f
o
r 
ti
m
b
e
r
A
m
o
u
n
t 
w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 p
a
y
m
e
n
t 
to
 l
im
it
e
d
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
, 
c
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
 o
r 
o
th
e
r 
c
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
A
m
o
u
n
t 
w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 i
n
te
re
s
t 
p
a
id
 o
u
t
A
m
o
u
n
t 
w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 d
iv
id
e
n
d
 p
a
id
 o
u
t
T
a
x
 a
t 
s
o
u
rc
e
 w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 d
iv
id
e
n
d
 (
p
a
id
 o
u
t 
to
 n
o
n
re
s
id
e
n
ts
)
T
a
x
 a
t 
s
o
u
rc
e
 w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 i
n
te
re
s
t 
a
n
d
 r
o
y
a
lt
ie
s
 (
p
a
id
 o
u
t 
to
 n
o
n
re
s
id
e
n
ts
)
T
a
x
 a
t 
s
o
u
rc
e
 w
it
h
h
e
ld
 f
ro
m
 i
n
te
re
s
t 
in
c
o
m
e
 (
o
f 
re
s
id
e
n
ts
)
0
5
0
 R
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0
6
0
 T
a
x
 t
y
p
e
 c
o
d
e
0
5
2
 P
e
ri
o
d
 i
n
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
0
5
3
 Y
e
a
r
0
6
1
 A
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
ta
x
 p
a
y
a
b
le
e
u
ro
c
e
n
ts
M
o
n
th
ly
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
M
M
o
n
th
ly
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
M
o
n
th
ly
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
M
o
n
th
ly
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
M
o
n
th
ly
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
F
o
r 
ta
x
p
a
y
e
rs
 o
f 
ta
x
 o
n
 i
n
s
u
ra
n
c
e
 p
re
m
iu
m
s
 (
v
a
k
u
u
tu
s
m
a
k
s
u
v
e
ro
):
N
o
-a
c
ti
v
it
y
 p
e
ri
o
d
 o
f 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 s
u
b
je
c
t 
to
 i
n
s
u
ra
n
c
e
-p
re
m
iu
m
 t
a
x
0
5
4
 
0
5
6
 
P
e
ri
o
d
 -
P
e
ri
o
d
 -
0
5
5
 Y
e
a
r
0
5
7
 Y
e
a
r
s
ta
rt
e
n
d
D
a
te
S
ig
n
a
tu
re
 a
n
d
 p
ri
n
te
d
 n
a
m
e
0
4
2
 T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
V
E
R
O
H
 4
0
0
1
e
/2
  
1
.2
0
1
2
M
F
ig
ur
e
18
:
P
er
io
di
c
Ta
x
R
et
ur
ns
40
Ta
bl
e
7:
Q
ue
st
io
ns
re
la
te
d
to
at
ti
tu
de
s
to
w
ar
ds
th
e
ta
x
au
th
or
ity
(A
1-
A
6)
Fo
r
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
qu
es
tio
ns
,p
le
as
e
ci
rc
le
th
e
op
in
io
n,
w
hi
ch
is
cl
os
es
t
to
yo
ur
ow
n.
St
ro
ng
ly
A
gr
ee
A
gr
ee
U
nd
ec
id
ed
D
isa
gr
ee
St
ro
ng
ly
D
isa
gr
ee
1
2
3
4
5
A
1.
D
ea
lin
g
w
ith
th
e
ta
x
au
th
or
iti
es
is
ea
sy
.
A
2.
I
ha
ve
se
ar
ch
ed
fo
r
ta
x-
re
la
te
d
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
du
rin
g
th
e
la
st
m
on
th
.
A
3.
C
le
ar
er
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
w
ou
ld
in
du
ce
m
or
e
ac
cu
ra
te
re
po
rt
in
g
of
pe
rio
di
c
ta
x
re
-
tu
rn
s.
A
4.
E
xa
m
pl
es
re
la
te
d
to
ta
x
re
po
rt
in
g
ha
ve
he
lp
ed
m
e
in
re
po
rt
in
g
m
y
ta
xe
s.
A
5.
T
he
us
e
of
el
ec
tr
on
ic
ta
x
re
po
rt
in
g
ha
s
he
lp
ed
m
e
in
re
po
rt
in
g
m
y
ta
xe
s.
A
6.
In
th
e
pe
rio
di
c
ta
x
re
tu
rn
I
fin
d
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
di
ffi
cu
lt:
N
ot
e:
Tr
an
sl
at
ed
fr
om
F
in
ni
sh
by
th
e
au
th
or
s.
41
Ta
bl
e
8:
B
ac
kg
ro
un
d
qu
es
ti
on
s
(B
1-
B
6)
B
1.
D
o
yo
u
yo
ur
se
lf
ta
ke
ca
re
of
ta
x
re
po
rt
in
g?
ye
s
no
,
so
m
e
ot
he
r
pe
rs
on
in
ou
r
fir
m
ta
ke
s
ca
re
of
it
no
,
an
ac
co
un
ti
ng
co
m
pa
ny
ta
ke
s
ca
re
of
it
it
is
ta
ke
n
ca
re
of
in
so
m
e
di
ffe
re
nt
w
ay
1
2
3
4
B
2.
A
re
yo
u
an
en
tr
ep
re
ne
ur
?
ye
s
no
1
2
B
3.
H
av
e
yo
u
be
en
an
en
tr
ep
re
ne
ur
be
fo
re
?
ye
s
no
1
2
B
4.
Fo
r
ho
w
lo
ng
ha
ve
yo
u
be
en
an
en
tr
ep
re
ne
ur
?
ye
ar
s
B
5.
Fo
r
ho
w
lo
ng
ha
ve
yo
u
be
en
w
or
ki
ng
in
yo
ur
cu
rr
en
t
fir
m
?
ye
ar
s
B
6.
Se
x
m
al
e
fe
m
al
e
1
2
N
ot
e:
Tr
an
sl
at
ed
fr
om
F
in
ni
sh
by
th
e
au
th
or
s.
42
Ta
bl
e
9:
Q
ue
st
io
n
A
8
fo
r
la
bo
r-
in
te
ns
iv
e
se
rv
ic
es
A
8.
T
he
V
A
T
te
st
p
er
io
d
fo
r
la
b
or
-i
nt
en
si
ve
se
rv
ic
es
en
de
d
on
D
ec
em
b
er
31
,
20
11
.
U
nt
il
D
ec
em
b
er
31
,
20
11
th
e
va
lu
e
ad
de
d
ta
x
on
la
b
or
-i
nt
en
si
ve
se
rv
ic
es
w
as
9%
an
d
af
te
r
th
at
23
%
.
T
hi
s
ch
an
ge
w
ill
no
t
aff
ec
t
de
du
ct
io
ns
m
ad
e
fr
om
pu
rc
ha
se
s.
[..
.]
T
he
fo
llo
w
in
g
qu
es
ti
on
is
de
si
gn
ed
to
es
ti
m
at
e
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
fir
m
s
aff
ec
te
d
by
th
e
VA
T
ra
te
ch
an
ge
.
W
ill
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
th
e
ta
x
ra
te
s
in
yo
ur
fir
m
ch
an
ge
fr
om
th
e
pr
es
en
t
nu
m
be
r?
ye
s
no
do
n’
t
kn
ow
1
2
3
N
ot
e:
Tr
an
sl
at
ed
fr
om
Fi
nn
is
h
by
th
e
au
th
or
s.
43
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus
Government Institute for Economic Research
P.O.Box 1279
FI-00101 Helsinki
Finland
ISBN 978-952-274-089-2 (PDF)
ISSN 1798-0291 (PDF)
